Written by Alberto Giubilini (crossposted with the TORCH Medical Humanities Blog)
Based on the Medical Humanities workshop held on 13th October (with the support of the Uehiro Oxford Institute)
As is often the case in discussion around technology, thinking about the artificial requires thinking about the natural in the first place. For one thing, either concept is defined in opposition to, and therefore in terms of, the other. Everything that is non-natural is artificial, and vice versa. For another, the boundary between the two is often hard to pin down, so that questions about how to draw the line are inevitable. Sometimes, thinking about the artificial requires thinking about the meaning and value not so much of the natural in general, but of being human specifically. Consider AI, for instance. Artificial ‘intelligence’, ‘autonomous’ artificial agents, ‘trusting’ AI, and so on are phrases that only make sense if we have a clear enough idea of what ‘intelligence’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘trust’ are in the first place. And these are all dimensions of being human.
Similar considerations can be made with regard to technologies affecting the embodied dimension of being human, and specifically human prosthetics. The Medical Humanities workshop on “Prosthetic Body: the human, the human-like, and the monstrous” offered a humanities-based reflection on the exciting, life-changing, and sometimes futuristic prosthetic technologies being developed at the Department of Engineering Science at the University of Oxford and elsewhere. With it, inevitably, it offered a reflection on what it means to have a truly human body or, if you prefer, to be an embodied being.
Engineering scientist Digby Chappell (Oxford) offered an overview of the technology under consideration, after which 4 panellists from philosophy, history of art, literature, and history of medicine raised questions around the meaning and value of the “natural” body; about standards of normality and their implications for our understanding of disability; and about the various cultural and political layers that disabled, modified, enhanced bodies have acquired throughout art, history, and literature.
Rather than summarising each panellist’s talk, I would like here to list a few points that stood out from my own perspective. After all, multidisciplinarity is as much about the diversity of disciplinary perspectives brought into a discussion as it is about the different take-home points for different disciplines. Thus, from the perspective of someone working in philosophical bioethics with an interest in the ethics of human enhancement, the workshop was an opportunity to reflect on the following.
First, when it comes to the human body, its shape, and its integrations with prosthetics, ‘normality’ can be understood in different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. Some standards of normality are aesthetic and some are in terms of functionality. Importantly, sometimes the two overlap and indeed are interdependent, both conceptually and in their figurative representation. Art historian Charlotte Dewarumez (Toulouse), for instance, discussed the case of anatomical illustrations in the 18th and 19th Century, which often relied on the model of the male body from classical Greek sculpture as their reference point for the depiction of the healthy body. This implied a standard of ‘normality’ which is quite different from that of the statistically normal body, and yet one which influenced the attitudes of medical practitioners for centuries. The assumption that the proclaimed objectivity of medicine could make it immune from visual culture was in this way challenged.
Second, the human body modified through prosthetics can be perceived and conceptualized as not (fully) human, but it is an open question whether this means less-than-human, more-than-human, or just different. And it is an open question whether any such conceptualization carries or should carry a negative, a positive, or a neutral connotation. Let’s think about the distinction mentioned above between functional and aesthetic normality. If we understand deviations from normality introduced by prosthetics in terms of functionality, there is a question about how those conceptualizations – less-than-human, more-than-human, or just different – affect judgments of those physical dysfunctions that we consider “disabilities”. However, if we understand these deviations from the norm in terms of appearance, there is a question about the aesthetic and political perception of the ‘monstrous’ body. The concept of a ‘monster’, as French Literature scholar Wes Williams (Oxford) explained, did not originally have the negative connotation that it currently has. In the sense of Old French ‘monstre’, the term ‘monstruous’ was simply referring to a way of indicating and thinking about diversity regarding the human body.
Third, and related to the previous point, there is a question about how various layers of political and ethical meanings have been historically added to the body that is ‘different’, whether the difference happened by nature or by accident or by human interventions (including prosthetics). Historian Olivia Bennison (Oxford) discussed various representations of prosthetic hands in figurative arts. She emphasised how the representation or, sometimes, lack of representation of prosthetic limbs in statues and portraits of historical figures conveyed ethical perceptions of the time. For instance, the statue of seaman Christopher Newport at Newport University depicts him with two biological hands, instead of a prosthetic hook as his right arm. The omission seems to suggest a kind of reluctance, or even shame, in having visible prosthetics. On the other hand, some Early modern portraits display prosthetics to highlight a person’s war achievement. Prosthetics and disability thus take a different meaning depending on their causes, their cultural connotation, and the social status of the person. Still today, a paralympic athlete won’t be perceived in the same way as a regular disabled person is, because the implications in terms of status are different.
Finally, and perhaps capturing the fil rouge of these 3 considerations and the whole workshop, there is a question about the role of technology in our self-perception. Our lives happen in a constant interaction with technologies. Our understanding of ourselves and of the world cannot do without an understanding of the way we integrate tools into our lives. Tools provide solutions to many practical problems, but at the same time keep raising questions about the nature of being human and of the technological world that is constitutive of our existence. Philosopher Helene Scott-Fordsmand (UCL) made this point with reference to Heidegger’s philosophy, emphasising how tools, including prosthetics integrated into our body, should promote our ability to ask questions about ourselves rather than closing off such reflection. That is, they should not be seen simply as ways of fixing problems, but also as opportunities for reflecting on human existence.
There is a more general point at stake in this last consideration that is available also to those who, like me, are not as well acquainted with Heideggerian philosophy. And that is precisely the point with which we started, which can now be reformulated in a more precise way. What, if any, is the natural, normal, healthy, functional state of the human body? What is the relationship between these four concepts, and which of these are coextensive with which ones? Are these merely descriptive terms, or do they carry any ethical, political, or cultural connotation that should inform the development of human prosthetics?
We hope this event can constitute the first step towards further reflection and further projects addressing these or related questions. Anyone willing to contribute to this discussion, either with more questions or, why not?, some answer, is most welcome to get in touch with suggestions for further workshops or projects.
As always, the Medical Humanities Hub is open to anyone who wish to be included in the conversation.